INTRODUCTION
Should employers be able to require individual employees to sign away their rights to collective action as a condition of employment? Certainly, employees should wonder just what they are giving up when they sign dispute resolution "agreements" 1 in order to get a job. These employer-mandated contract provisions generally require the exclusive use of individual arbitration for future employment disputes, preventing access to group action in court or arbitration. In many instances, employees are also barred from seeking relief from administrative agencies that protect the rights of workers such as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Does the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 -a federal labor law that guarantees the right of employees to act in concert for mutual aid or protection-permit such waivers, or must the Federal Arbitration Act * Professor of Business Law, Carroll School of Management, Boston College. The author wishes to thank Professors Stephanie Greene and Margo E. K. Reder of Boston College for their helpful ideas on this paper.
1. Arguably the word "agreement" is a misnomer because the "agreement" to the provision is generally a requirement in order for the employee to obtain employment. Thus, it is an adhesive contract provision that is unfavorable to the employee and not made a subject for negotiation. Individual arbitration as the exclusive remedy is literally stuck onto the hiring deal, which the employee only "agrees" to in order to obtain employment. Thus, this "agreement" is a "take it or leave it" matter-although, in some instances, employers allow a brief period to opt out of the dispute resolution program (DRP) that is otherwise the default. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has taken the position that an opportunity to opt out does not save individual DRPs from violating the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), but some courts have been inclined to look more favorably at optout provisions. Compare On Assignment Staffing Servs., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 189, at *4, 6 (Aug. 27, 2015) (finding the opt-out provisions interfere with Section 7 rights and are contrary to federal labor law policy), rev'd summarily per curiam, No. 15-60642, 2016 WL 3685206 (5th Cir. June 6, 2016) with Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale's, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the plaintiff's decision to enter into an arbitration agreement did not amount to an unfair labor practice). The Ninth Circuit upheld a DRP agreement requiring arbitration and prohibiting joinder of claims because an employee had the right to opt out of the DRP, which she did not exercise, and thereafter could not claim that enforcement of DRP violates Norris-LaGuardia or the NLRA. Johnmohammadi, 755 F.3d at 1077. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the DRP must be enforced according to its terms. Thus, had she opted out, she would have been free to pursue this class action in court. "joint, class, or collective claims addressing wages, hours, or other working conditions against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial" as a condition of employment. 7 The NLRB found that requiring individual employees to sign such agreements, as opposed to a union agreeing to resolve disputes through arbitration in a collective bargaining agreement, amounted to an unfair labor practice. 8 The restraints on collective action work against the policies and purposes of the NLRA, which policies and purposes include fostering concerted activity in order to equalize the bargaining power of employees against the superior strength of the employer. 9 As large, well-established corporate entities crafted increasingly expansive arbitration provisions foreclosing access to judicial tribunals and restricting joinder of claims, provisions that restrict individuals' rights to engage in collective activity and class actions, the Supreme Court has reflexively upheld such provisions based upon its interpretation of the FAA's supremacy. 10 The Supreme Court has upheld arbitration clauses for consumer, merchant credit, and employment matters without concern for the Constitutional right to a judicial forum, 11 or for the deleterious effect on other federal laws regarding securities, antitrust, employment, and consumer protection. 12 To date, the NLRB has been, in a sense, like the canary in the coal mine on this mandatory arbitration issue, consistently messaging that individual arbitration, imposed as a condition of employment, violates employees' federal statutory rights to engage in collective action. 
2017] WILL THE SUPREME COURT AGREE WITH THE NLRB? 519
The right to collective action is truly the centerpiece of the NLRA, recognized as such because without it, employees lack bargaining power, mass, organization, and expertise for managing employment matters with their employers. The right to engage in protected, concerted activity embodied in Section 7 of the NLRA created an employee bill of rights in the private sector workplace.
14 Importantly, employees need not be in a union or forming a union in order to gain the protection of Section 7, rather, the right to engage in concerted activities for "mutual aid or protection" and the right to refrain from engaging in such activities are all clearly spelled out in the statute. Section 7, with its protective umbrella for collective action, is the heart of the NLRA, and the NLRB has held that employers may not require individual employees to sign away this right to act together in order to secure employment, even where such waivers are cast as voluntary or "optional." 15 Subordinating the foundation of this federal labor statute to the FAA, without statutory directive or even legislative history supporting this intent, would decimate the very purpose of the labor law without providing a corresponding benefit under the FAA. Limiting arbitration to individual claims is not a central concern of the FAA, rather, it is the strategy of big business to limit its exposure to workplace dispute claims by unilaterally imposing such restrictive predispute contract terms as a condition of employment. 14. Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . . 18 the future is questionable regarding the Court's potential endorsement of employment agreements that require waivers of collective or class actions and mandate individual arbitration-a topic on which the Supreme Court has yet to rule -that could gut the substance of the NLRA to achieve a goal that the FAA does not require.
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This research paper analyzes five recent cases on the issue of mandatory arbitration clauses that prohibit joinder of individual employment claims. The first case, On Assignment, was one of first impression for the NLRB where the agency answered the question of whether providing an opportunity to opt out of a mandatory dispute resolution program with a class waiver saves the provision from violating the NLRA. 20 The NLRB ruled that opt-out provisions do not validate such class waivers.
21
The Fifth Circuit granted the employer's motion for summary reversal of the Board's order in On Assignment. 22 This follows the Fifth Circuit's pattern of refusing to enforce the NLRB's other related decisions on mandatory pre-dispute individual arbitration provisions with collective action waivers in both D. R. Horton 41 In both of those opinions, the NLRB held that when employers require employees to waive their right to "joint, class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or other working conditions against their employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial" as a condition of employment, they violate the NLRA. 42 The NLRB stated that it is not an unfair labor practice if a union negotiates a collective bargaining agreement that provides for arbitration of employment and other disputes between an employer and employee(s) because, in that case, a union acts as a representative for the bargaining unit of employees, providing inherent access to employees' group strength. 43 The Board noted it is well settled that a properly certified or recognized union may waive certain rights under Section 7 in return for other concessions in the context of collective bargaining. 44 The Board also clarified that it is a different matter if the arbitration agreement allows the employee to retain the right to bring a class action in court, because an employer's requirement that an employee waive his or her right to collective or group arbitration would not present the same problem, as another avenue for collective action remains. 45 The NLRB was clear that it was not mandating class arbitration in such circumstances. 46 The NLRB in D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil did not address the question whether an employer could avoid violating the NLRA when requiring employees to agree to individually arbitrate all employment claims, if the employees were afforded an opportunity to opt-out of the provision. 47 Thus, the question was whether giving an employee an initial chance to opt-out of the arbitration provision rendered it acceptable since the mandatory aspect was ameliorated to a degree, making the arbitration alternative a choice, rather than a condition of, employment.
In On Assignment, employees were allowed ten days after receipt of the employer's dispute resolution agreement to opt-out of the individual arbitration procedure. 48 Absent opting out, the employee's signature acknowledging receipt of the agreement, along with the lapse of ten days, amounted to a waiver of the employee's statutory right to collective or class action. 49 The NLRB found that the possibility to opt-out did not make the agreement a choice rather than a condition of employment. 50 the opt-out procedure was viewed as a "second mandatory condition of employment" requiring affirmative action in order to retain the Section 7 right to collective action. 51 The Board viewed the requirement to act as a significant burden interfering with employees' exercise of Section 7 rights. 52 The NLRB noted that the arbitration agreement, even assuming arguendo that the opt-out provision prevented it from being a condition of employment, nevertheless remained unlawful because it was a prospective waiver of the right to engage in concerted activity. 53 Such agreements conflict with the purpose and policy of the NLRA and Norris-LaGuardia Acts by restricting employees' rights to engage in Section 7 protected activities. 54 This was so because of the prospective waiver of the right to engage in collective or class litigation in all forums in the absence of affirmatively opting out of the agreement within a very brief, specific time period.
55
In addition, the complaint alleged that the waiver was irrevocable.
56
The Dispute Resolution Agreement covered "any dispute arising out of or related to Employee's employment with, or termination of employment . . . ." including employment disputes regarding statutory claims, and made individual final and binding arbitration the exclusive forum, specifically preventing access to court and a jury trial. 57 An exception from coverage existed for private attorney general representative actions but nonetheless an employee was permitted to seek an individual remedy for such violations in arbitration. 58 The class action waiver in On Assignment provided that employees would not be discriminated against for exercising their rights under Section 7 of the NLRA but the company retained its right to enforce the waiver and seek dismissal of employees' class, collective or representative claims, an arrangement that effectively undermined any exercise of class or collective rights. 59 If this provision was deemed to be unenforceable or unconscionable, void or voidable, challenges to the provision would be decided by a judicial rather than an arbitral forum. 60 The failure to opt out within ten days was deemed acceptance of the arbitration agreement. The NLRB outlined two questions regarding On Assignment's arbitration agreement: (1) whether it was a mandatory condition of employment, and therefore controlled by the D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil decisions, and (2) whether the agreement was unlawful even if not mandatory. 62 The NLRB quickly rejected the Employer's assertion that the agreement was not mandatory because of the ten-day opt-out period, finding the agreement, along with its opt-out clause, were conditions of employment.
63
The NLRB applied the test of whether an employer's conduct "reasonably tends to interfere" with the exercise of employees' Section 7 rights. 64 The NLRB found that the opt-out procedure did reasonably interfere because it required employees to take specific affirmative steps within a ten-day period, or risk losing their statutory rights. 65 Requiring employees to take such action in order to preserve rights is a burden on their exercise, just as a rule requiring permission or advance notice to an employer in order to engage in protected concerted activity would be unlawful.
66
One of the reasons why opt-out provisions do not heal the Section 7 problems inherent in imposing affirmative obligations on employees in order for them to preserve their statutory rights is that failure to act means employees lose their Section 7 rights. Thus, the default position brought on by failure to opt-out is individual arbitration which bars concerted activity. It would be slightly less egregious if a mandatory arbitration agreement was an option to opt-in to individual arbitration, and the default was one that allowed the employee to retain Section 7 rights, because then at least the presumption would be in favor of retaining the right to engage in protected concerted activities. But even with the latter opt-in option, the whole dynamic is creating a choice in a situation where the employer holds the power and the employee is forced to choose at her peril. If the employee chooses to opt-out of arbitration, it could result in loss of employment or some perceived lack of support for the employer's chosen system of dispute resolution. In On Assignment, the NLRB quoted language from the Norris-LaGuardia Act to support its position that whether such agreements were imposed as conditions of employment or characterized as voluntary undertakings, they violate federal labor policy because "the 'individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and In addition, the opt-out procedure interfered with Section 7 rights because it required employees to make an "observable choice" illustrating their position concerning concerted activity. 68 Free choice to exercise Section 7 rights includes freedom from employer knowledge of the employees' views as well as freedom from fear of reprisal for pro-union views. 69 Requiring employees to choose options that are unlawfulunlawful because they require irrevocable waiver of Section 7 rights or else declare their election to opt-out-places employees in a position where they would reasonably believe that choosing the opt-out would be perceived negatively by the employer because of its "strong preference" for the waiver. 70 The opt-out procedure would result in an enduring record of the employee's position on this issue and this too would tend to push employees in the opposite direction, defaulting to a permanent loss of Section 7 rights. 71 The Board found that the arbitration agreement was unlawful, and the opt-out procedure itself was a burden on, and an interference with, exercise of Section 7 rights. 72 The NLRB noted that the requirement of affirmative action to avoid the permanent waiver of substantive rights as well as the then diminished pool of those free to join in collective action underscored that even with an opt-out procedure, the dispute resolution agreement was a mandatory condition of employment.
73
But even if the DRA was not a mandatory condition, the Board made clear that it would reach the same result. 74 The NLRB went further in On Assignment than it did in D. R. Horton, holding that even non-mandatory agreements with individual employees "to resolve . . . all potential employment disputes through non-class arbitration rather than litigation in court" were "contrary to the National Labor Relations Act and to fundamental principles of federal labor policy." 75 The Board held that the Federal Arbitration Act did not require the federal labor law to yield, reaffirming its consistent opposition to 67 This is so even if the individual employment contracts are voluntary, and thus not a condition of employment. 78 The problem with foreclosing all potential for collective action is that it curtails the "full freedom of association" that is protected by the NLRA. 79 The NLRB refuted the existence of conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act, noting the NorrisLaGuardia Act provides the FAA must yield to the NLRA should any arbitration initiative conflict with the public policy goals supporting the NLRA. 80 The NLRB recognized the inequality of bargaining power between employers and individual employees such that the concept of voluntariness with respect to individual unorganized employees made little difference. 81 Thus, whether considered voluntary or a condition of employment, prospective individual waivers of Section 7 collective action were both deemed illegal by the NLRB.
82
In rejecting the dissent's argument that employee acquiescence to a voluntary dispute resolution agreement with an opt-out provision is a 'de minimis' condition, the majority found that the right to engage in concerted legal activity is a fundamental substantive right. 83 On Assignment required employees to act within ten days to reject the waiver provision, thus obliging employees to act quickly in order to protect their Section 7 rights. 84 Absent employee action, the mandatory individual arbitration provision takes effect by default. In On Assignment, the NLRB granted the General Counsel's motion for summary judgment, finding the employer's mandatory arbitration agreement violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and required the employer to discontinue the policy and notify employees of the discontinuation. 84. Id. at *8 (describing how the mandatory condition of employment puts an affirmative duty on employees to act if they wish not to be bound by the agreement).
85. Id. at *1, *10-11 (mandating that respondent rescind or revise the agreement as well as post a notice at all locations where the agreement was in effect). rather than labor law, objecting to the preemption of the common law of contracts by the NLRA. 86 Yet that is the very thing that federal law is supposed to do, preempt state law when it is in direct conflict with it. Member Johnson also found that the opt-out opportunity made the arbitration agreement voluntary rather than mandatory, in contrast to the view of the majority. 87 Because of his view that an employee was free to enter into the dispute resolution agreement or not as "an equal bargaining partner," Member Johnson found that the DRA did not violate the Act.
88
He dismissed the distinction between arbitration agreed to in collective bargaining agreements, as compared to arbitration agreements between an employer and an individual employee as making "no difference" since both consign dispute resolution to arbitration and waive Section 7 rights. 89 However, in the collective bargaining context, the Section 7 right to collective action is not waived since it is collectively bargained for and agreed to by the union as representative of the employees. This is in contrast to the individual employee context, where there is no collective strength when an employee must quickly decide whether to risk the displeasure of a brand new employer's preference for arbitration. Member Johnson suggested that even if the individual arbitration agreement were "a prospective waiver of a substantive statutory right, a proper accommodation of the NLRA and the FAA would require finding that such a waiver does not violate the Act."
90 Board Member Johnson found this to be so because one of the FAA's fundamental statutory attributes of arbitration is the irrevocability of an agreement to settle disputes by arbitration. 91 Member Johnson determined this despite the fact that it is the Board's responsibility to interpret the NLRA in light of changing industrial trends, 92 one of which is the increasing employer imposition of arbitration upon individual employee's workplace disputes, in most cases where there is "no union present or waiting in the wings." 93 86. Id. at *9, *11-12 (detailing how Member Johnson believes the majority has gone too far in rendering mandatory individual-specific arbitration contracts unlawful).
87. 97 The only prospect for support of the NLRB's position on mandatory individual arbitration agreements before the Fifth Circuit lies in its recent unpublished decision in which the panel found that such a provision violated the NLRA when it reasonably could be construed to bar access to filing unfair labor practice charges at the NLRB.
98
In that case, however, there was no opt-out provision, a factor that seems to matter more to some courts than to the NLRB. 99 The dissenter in On Assignment wrote that the majority could not find a single decision that supported the NLRB's view in Murphy Oil, 100 but there is growing evidence of judicial support for the NLRB's position in the several recent cases discussed next. 102 The defendants moved the case to federal court where they were partially successful in getting a motion to compel individual arbitration.
103 Judge Gee upheld the Board's position in D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil in a case where a dispute resolution plan (DRP) was a condition of employment, and the DRP limited disputes to individual, rather than collective, arbitration.
104
The DRP had a savings clause providing that if the DRP was held unenforceable, then it would not apply to class or representative actions "which shall proceed instead before the court." 105 Employee Totten claimed that he did not receive a copy of the DRP, despite signing an agreement acknowledging he had received and reviewed it and that certain legal claims would be resolved through arbitration rather than in court. 106 Totten argued that the agreement was unconscionable and therefore void.
107
As to the first prong of an unconscionability theory, Totten asserted the DRP was procedurally unconscionable because he was not given an opportunity to negotiate terms. 108 The district court agreed, reasoning his argument was further supported by the employer's failure to 101 give the employee a copy of the DRP or associated rules. 109 As to the second prong of the theory, substantive unconscionability, Totten asserted the following: a lack of mutuality; the ability of the employer to unilaterally modify the terms (which the court severed based upon a severability clause in the agreement); a requirement that the discovery costs be borne by the party taking the discovery, that attorneys' fees to be awarded by an arbitrator to either party including the company, and that the class and representative waivers violated the NLRA and California public policy. 110 The court did not find a lack of mutuality, but did find the modification provision illusory and therefore unconscionable.
111
The discovery costs and attorneys' fee provisions were not substantively unconscionable in the court's view. 112 However, the court upheld the NLRB's assertion that class action waivers violated Section 7 substantive rights, finding the Supreme Court's precedents concerning arbitration inapplicable since they did not squarely address substantive federal statutory rights. 113 The federal district court agreed with the dissent in D. R. Horton II, holding that the arbitration agreement's interference with a substantive statutory right made it unenforceable. 114 In addition, the court noted that none of the cases cited by the defendants were controlling precedent, nor were these cases persuasive due to a lack of substantive analysis of what the court, as well as the NLRB for that matter, perceived to be the critical issue, namely, the class action waiver's interference with substantive statutory rights of the NLRA. 115 Thus, the trial court refused to enforce the class action waiver in the arbitration agreement and held that the class could proceed to court.
116
Just a few weeks later, Judge Wright from the same federal district court issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part defendant Kellogg Brown & Root's motion to compel arbitration against Totten on claims covered by the mandatory arbitration provision. 117 The district court found that there was no evidence of substantive unconscionability and only 109 118 However, because Totten's Section 7 claims were not subject to the arbitration program in light of a specific exemption regarding such claims, these were not submitted to arbitration. 119 State law claims that Totten initially brought in state court were not specifically exempted from arbitration and thus "may be subject to arbitration" according to the court. 120 Totten claimed that the arbitration provision was an adhesion contract that was "implicitly procedurally unconscionable" and that KBR's failure to provide a copy of the program to him was similarly procedurally unconscionable. 121 The court found that since Totten signed an acknowledgement that he had read and agreed to the DRP, he failed to prove that he did not agree to it and his procedural unconscionability argument failed.
122
With respect to Totten's substantive unconscionability arguments, the court found none persuasive.
123
This was so because the arbitratordetermined discovery was deemed adequate, mutuality was not lacking since both parties were bound by the DRP, the ability to unilaterally modify terms applied to prospective disputes only, and attorneys' fees were awardable by the arbitrator to the prevailing party based upon applicable law. 124 There was no mention of Section 7 of the NLRA, D. R. Horton, or Murphy Oil in the district court's order in February.
Thereafter, in April, an NLRB ALJ ruled on the legality of Kellogg Brown & Root's DRP. 125 The judge found that KBR engaged in unfair labor practices by maintaining a mandatory individual arbitration policy as a condition of employment that prohibited employees from pursuing claims in a class or representative capacity in both judicial and arbitral forums, and seeking to enforce the policy against the Charging Party, Totten. 126 The ALJ ordered the employer to rescind or revise the existing DRP, in accordance with the NLRB's requirements as stated in D. R. Horton 128 The ALJ also ordered the employer to pay Totten for expenses resulting from its opposition to the class claims, and post a notice onsite as well as electronically regarding the ALJ's order. 129 The outcome of the Totten appeal at the Ninth Circuit may add to the circuit split begun by the Seventh Circuit, discussed next. 132 a case that she noted involved a similar waiver in an arbitration clause to the instant case. 133 In Waterstone, Judge Crabb found the waiver inconsistent with the NLRB's D. R. Horton decision. 134 She noted that the Board's reasoning was straightforward and that both the Board and the courts have found that lawsuits for unpaid wages by multiple plaintiffs are one type of protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the Act. 135 Thus, according to the court, Waterstone's waiver on collective action in the arbitration agreement violated §8(a)(1) of the NLRA. Circuit's majority opinion did not persuade her otherwise.
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS
137
The court found that no distinction was made by the respondent employer between the collective action waivers in Waterstone and Epic Systems. 138 Because the waiver at Epic had a savings clause-providing that if the class or collective claim waiver was found to be unenforceable, then any class, collective, or representative action must be filed in court as the exclusive forum-the court noted that its decision that the waiver was invalid made the rest of plaintiff's argument moot and resulted in a denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss. 139 It should be noted that this savings clause appears to cut off administrative agency claims, or a reasonable person would so conclude, something that the NLRB finds problematic.
The oral argument in the Epic Systems appeal took place on February 12, 2016, and the Seventh Circuit granted the NLRB's motion to participate in the oral argument, which it did towards the end of the session. 140 This was the first time that the NLRB participated in an oral argument as an amicus at the appellate level on the class waiver issue. . In Patterson, the federal district court held that an employment arbitration provision was enforceable, rejecting plaintiff's argument that the employee arbitration program (EAP) carved out rights under the NLRA. The district court noted that the EAP stated that the right to file an unfair labor practice charge under the NLRA was not prevented, and the court found that the class action waiver overrode the EAP's language that might be read to include collective activity outside of filing an unfair labor practice claim at the NLRB. The court found no new arguments were asserted by the plaintiff that would persuade it to alter its earlier opinion in The judge noted that Epic's email to employees containing the arbitration agreement provided no option to optout of the agreement, that employees were considered to have accepted the agreement if they continued employment, and that the email contained instructions to review and acknowledge their agreement by clicking two buttons. 152 Lewis complied with these instructions but later sought relief from alleged Fair Labor Standards Act violations in federal district court.
153
The district court agreed with Lewis and the NLRB's D. R. Horton ruling that the individual arbitration with collective action waiver violated the NLRA because it interfered with employees' concerted activities for mutual aid and protection. 154 The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo.
155
The appellate court outlined longstanding precedent holding that the NLRA prevents employers from imposing contractual waivers of Section 7 rights to engage in concerted activities upon individual employees. 156 Collective legal proceedings are included in such concerted activities, and assist in equalizing the bargaining power of employees, one of the central purposes of the NLRA. 157 Following the NLRB's reasoning in D. R. Horton, the Seventh Circuit deferred to the Board's sensible interpretation of the statutory language, finding that employers may not use such individual waivers to bar access to collective remedies. 158 The court noted that "Section 7's . including legal proceedings when it enacted the NLRA, and, in light of the plain language of Section 7 and 8 of the Act, contract provisions seeking to waive employees' access to such remedies are unenforceable.
160
The court declared that Epic's arbitration provision impinged on Section 7 rights, running "straight into the teeth of Section 7" in that it prohibited collective, representative, or class legal proceedings which are concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. 161 Such provisions are unlawful under the NLRA and unenforceable. 162 The Seventh Circuit outlined that their earlier opinion in NLRB v. Stone, which it noted had not been undermined, would prompt a different conclusion from that reached by the Ninth Circuit in Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale's, Inc. 163 Thus, unlike the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the availability of an opt-out from the individual arbitration and class waiver cured the illegality, the Seventh Circuit's earlier decision in NLRB v. Stone held that where an individual is "obligated to bargain individually," an arbitration agreement limiting Section 7 rights was a per se violation of the NLRA which could not "be legalized by showing the contract was entered into without coercion." 164 Nonetheless, despite the Seventh Circuit's dicta regarding the ability of an opt-out to cure such a provision, the court disclaimed the need to resolve this dissonance between the circuits since, in the instant case, Epic provided no opt-out to its agreement, making its arbitration provision a clear condition of continued employment that interfered with employees exercising their Section 7 rights. 165 Next the court turned to the impact of the Federal Arbitration Act on employees' rights under the NLRA, responding to Epic's contention that the FAA should override the NLRA. 166 The court essentially followed the NLRB's reasoning in D. R. Horton, that the FAA savings clause permits invalidation of agreements to arbitrate relating to generally applicable contract defenses, of which illegality is one such ground, ensuring that the two statutes "work hand in glove." 167 Horton, the Seventh Circuit saw no conflict between the two statutes in light of the operation of the FAA's savings clause, the FAA's silence regarding the necessity of individual arbitration, and the NLRA's proarbitration stance in that it "expressly allows unions and employers to arbitrate disputes between each other."
168
The problem with Epic's provision was that it banned collective action including collective arbitration and thus it "ran up against the substantive right to act collectively that the NLRA gives to employees." 169 The court stated that the two statutes in question are both federal and on "equal footing."
170 The FAA's savings clause prevents the FAA from mandating the enforcement of the collective action waiver, and works with the NLRA's prohibition of employers interfering with employees' protected concerted activities.
171
In Lewis v. Epic Systems, the Seventh Circuit noted that the NLRA makes it illegal for an employer contracting with an individual to waive his Section 7 rights, and that even the attempt to do so is unlawful. 172 The court declined to find that the NLRA was in conflict with the FAA, stating that this would make the FAA's savings clause "a nullity," which runs contrary to rules of statutory construction requiring the reading of all words and clauses as having meaning. 173 The court agreed with the NLRB that Section 7 rights are substantive, the very core of the statute, with the rest of the NLRA serving to enforce the rights that Section 7 protects. 174 The court noted that a " 'prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies'-that is, of a substantive rightare not enforceable." 175 The court distinguished the substantive right to collective action in Section 7 of the NLRA from the procedural device of class actions under other employment statutes, finding that the collective process was central to the Section 7 right, and that other employment statutes do not guarantee collective process but "[t]he NLRA does."
176
The court compared the associational rights embodied in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to the collective right in Section 7, finding that it would be "odd indeed to consider . . . [ court's strong belief in the importance of the associational right in Section 7 by equating it to the associational rights safeguarded by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Just as the First Amendment is foundational to the Bill of Rights, Section 7 is the foundation of the NLRA, which has also been equated to a workplace bill of rights. 178 The NLRB looks to protect the exercise of Section 7 rights in much the same way that courts protect the exercise of First Amendment rights, and both have good reason to look askance at prior restraints on the exercise or restraint from exercise of these fundamental rights. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the NLRB's position on mandatory individual arbitration provisions with class waivers, and noted that none of the courts that disagreed with the NLRB have "engaged substantively with the relevant arguments." Exactly one week after the Seventh Circuit issued its ruling supporting the NLRB in Lewis v. Epic Systems, the Eighth Circuit found that a similar collective action waiver in an arbitration agreement did not violate the NLRA, following its own precedent in Owen v. Bristol Care and similar rulings from the Fifth Circuit. 180 In Cellular Sales of Missouri, the panel granted the employer's petition for review in part, and denied it in part.
181
The denial affected the bulk of the NLRB's order relating to the arbitration provision's class waiver that the NLRB had found violated the NLRA. 182 When John Bauer was hired as an employee in January 2012, he signed an employment agreement as a condition of employment. 183 The agreement required individual arbitration of all claims, disputes or 184 The arbitration was final, binding and while enforceable in court, it was not appealable. 185 When Bauer's employment ended in May 2012, he brought a class action in federal court alleging FLSA violations. 186 The district court granted the employer's motion to compel arbitration of the dispute pursuant to the employment agreement.
187
Bauer proceeded to arbitration where the parties settled and the lawsuit was dismissed. 188 Meanwhile, Bauer filed an unfair labor practice charge at the NLRB in light of the class action waiver in the arbitration agreement that he was required to sign. 189 The Board issued a complaint, an ALJ ruled in favor of the Board, and the NLRB affirmed.
190 The Board's order required the employer to rescind the arbitration agreement or revise it to preserve employees' rights to pursue collective action in some forum, either arbitral or judicial, and not restrict employees ability to file charges at the NLRB.
191
After reviewing the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo, the court refused to defer to the NLRB's legal interpretation beyond that relating to the NLRA. 192 Looking at the Fifth Circuit's refusal to enforce the NLRB in D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil, and its own decision in Owen v. Bristol Care, the Eighth Circuit granted the employer's petition for review and refused to enforce the NLRB's order regarding the class or collective action waiver. 193 However, the court enforced the part of the Board's order relating to the fact that the arbitration provision could reasonably be construed to bar employees from filing charges at the NLRB. 194 Without a savings clause to clarify that employees retained the right to file charges at the NLRB, the court agreed with the NLRB that the provision violated the Act and must be cured. 195 The employer argued that the arbitration agreement did not expressly prohibit employees from filing charges with the Board, nor did it mention agency or administrative proceedings, and thus it would not reasonably be construed to bar such filings. 196 The court was not persuaded by this argument and cited the Fifth Circuit's similar conclusion in D. R. Horton. 197 The breadth of the arbitration provision, as well as its generality, worked against the employer's argument, and the court noted that this was an area where the Board was entitled to deference in its reasonable interpretation of the arbitration agreement. 198 It is interesting that even the circuits that do not support the NLRB on the main issue regarding the illegality of class or collective action waivers in pre-dispute individual arbitration agreements, do agree with the NLRB about provisions that reasonably could be construed as barring the filing of claims at the NLRB. This could be in part because of the strong statutory provisions supporting employee access to the Board's processes. As the NLRB instructs, Section 8(a)(4) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act." This provision guards the right of employees to seek the protection of the Act by using the processes of the NLRB . . . .
[I]t forbids an employer to discharge, layoff, or engage in other forms of discrimination in working conditions against employees who have filed charges with the NLRB, given affidavits to NLRB investigators, or testified at an NLRB hearing. Violations of this section are in most cases also violations of Section 8(a)(3).
199
Protecting access to NLRB processes is clearly protected by the language of the statute which is aimed at preventing employer interference with Section 7 rights, and the Board's test with respect to determining if an employer mandated arbitration provision would reasonably be construed to bar access to the NLRB is a logical one that deserves the deference of the courts. However, the larger issue of the class waiver itself remains incorrectly decided by the Fifth, Eighth and Second Circuits. employees to pursue all work-related legal claims individually." 207 Nor may the employer condition employment on signing such a contract. 208 The appellate court vacated the district court's order compelling arbitration and remanded for the court to determine if the separate proceedings clause was severable.
209
Despite the victory for employees represented in Morris, the decision itself was divided two-to-one, with Judge Ikuta writing a lengthy and pointed dissent that objected to the majority's violation of the FAA's mandate to enforce arbitration agreements and U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 210 This case will be heard at the U.S. Supreme Court. 211 As it stands, the Ninth Circuit's decision follows the carefully crafted opinion of the Seventh Circuit in Lewis, which the majority noted was the only other circuit court to address the merits of the issue. 212 The opinion emphasized the centrality of Section 7 of the NLRA, which creates substantive rights that cannot be waived in individual arbitration agreements that represent the exclusive mechanism for dispute resolution. The court held that "[t]he NLRA precludes contracts that foreclose the possibility of concerted workrelated legal claims." 213 
VI.
OPTIONS TO There is considerable discussion about the conflict between the NLRB and the courts on the mandatory class action waiver issue and how it should or will play out. 214 The NLRB clearly upped its game by entering into 215 Epic Systems filed a notice that it planned to appeal its loss at the Seventh Circuit to the U.S. Supreme Court, and subsequently filed a petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. 216 Ernst & Young also filed a petition for certiorari, and employees at Raymours Furniture filed a petition for certiorari appealing the Second Circuit's decision to send each employment dispute to individual arbitration. 217 There are other appellate decisions that the Board or a defeated employer may appeal to the Supreme Court as well. There has been a the Seventh Circuit's decision in late May addressed all of the relevant arguments regarding interpretation of the NLRA and the effect on the FAA but that the court found no conflict with the FAA because Section 7 NLRA rights are substantive and may not be individually and prospectively waived, and the FAA savings clause harmonizes the two statutes where the agreement to arbitrate is illegal); Greene & O'Brien, supra note 5, at 128-30 (arguing that the courts should defer to the NLRB's position on D. R. Horton 
218
As the Supreme Court's new term began, there were four relevant petitions for certiorari before the Court. 219 Yet, there has been a wait for a grant of certiorari in these cases involving class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements, and it remains uncertain how the present or future Court will rule. 220 The Court was understaffed after the death of Justice Scalia, but that is likely to change in 2017. If President Obama's nominee Chief Justice Merrick Garland of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had been confirmed, the NLRB would have had a wellseasoned judge as the court's ninth member who has shown an understanding of the NLRB's role and been more than evenhanded in the The present Court is somewhat more likely to see things the NLRB's way on the class waiver issue than it would have when Justice Scalia was on the Court because of his pro-arbitration stance. 222 If the Court considered these cases before a ninth justice was confirmed, it is possible that there could have been a tie vote on an eight-member court, thus leaving the lower court decisions as law, and failing to resolve the conflict among the circuits.
If the Supreme Court does not agree with the NLRB's rulings in D. R. Horton, Murphy Oil, and On Assignment, perhaps the NLRB's next best chance of protecting collective action might lie in the passage of The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015 (AFA). 223 In addition to antitrust and civil rights actions, the AFA exempts consumer and employment disputes from mandatory arbitration, where the arbitration is not "truly voluntary" and is agreed to prior to the occurrence of a dispute. 224 The bill notes the problems with arbitration include the lack of transparency and inadequate judicial review.
225
The AFA does not ban arbitration but it targets agreements that sign away an employee's right to protest prior to the existence of a dispute. The proposed bill includes areas that are protected by statute beyond employment, such as consumer, antitrust and civil rights, directly addressing areas where the Supreme Court has ruled that the FAA mandates enforcement of arbitration provisions that bar collective or class action.
It seems that the AFA is not all that likely to be enacted, as its progress has stalled out in prior efforts; the last noted action on the bill was when it was reintroduced in late March of 2017, and its potential for passage is certainly not increased by the bill's support of the right to sue in court on all statutory claims even if there is a collective bargaining agreement with a dispute resolution process that ends in arbitration to encompass such claims. 226 This provision seems unnecessarily protective of employee rights to sue in court rather than in arbitration, at least with respect to the requirements of the NLRA, because when a majority representative acts for the group and negotiates a contract, there is collective action present and the inclusion of statutory claims has been agreed to in the process of negotiating the best terms for the entire bargaining unit. Preventing a union from including statutory claims in the arbitration process goes well beyond what the NLRA requires and could result in the bill losing support from unions, making it less likely that the proposed act will pass.
CONCLUSION
Employment is a basic need for most individuals, and low-level workers in particular have little or no bargaining power when confronted with a contract of employment that requires individual arbitration as the exclusive means of settling future disputes. The class action waiver provision that accompanies such agreements ensures that most employees will never pursue their legal rights because it is just too expensive for an individual to do so in arbitration. In contrast, the availability of class or collective action often provides access to a lawyer who would be compensated on a contingency fee basis. Cutting off this avenue and substituting individual arbitration, where the individual employee must pay and perhaps pay for the employer's costs as well if he/she loses, makes the dispute resolution mechanism all but illusory.
When prospective employees are forced to agree to a mandatory dispute resolution program with a collective action waiver, they are signing away rights they do not know they need long before they may need them. Arbitration is an excellent method for resolving disputes as long as it places the parties into a fair and neutral forum and both sides have an equivalent shot at justice. However, when arbitration is used as a sword by businesses to prevent individual employees from protesting violations of their federal and state statutory rights regarding employment conditions; when corporations write the rules and hire the judges, and employees are locked out of collective action by contract provisions that require them to sign away their rights if they want the job, the basic premise behind federal labor law is undermined, and employees are locked out of an equitable process.
The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act addresses the problem of 226. See id. at 2-6 (advocating that the FAA was not intended to encompass employee and consumer disputes, which are not justly adjudicated through arbitration in some circumstances). mandatory pre-dispute arbitration as a one-sided agreement where the deck is stacked and dealt by the employer and most employees simply cannot afford the ante in order to play the individual arbitration game. However, passage of the AFA seems a long shot at best. Thus, federal courts need to enforce the labor law as it was written, to protect concerted activity for organizational purposes and mutual aid or protection among employees, including collective action with respect to workplace disputes. Allowing employers to mandate individual arbitration and ban collective action is no better than the so-called 'yellow dog' contracts employers required employees to sign swearing that they would not join a union, thus waiving their federal statutory right to organize under the NLRA. Yellow dog contracts violated the NLRA and the courts upheld the NLRB when it found such contracts illegal. The NLRB ruled that mandatory individual arbitration provisions with collective action waivers violate the NLRA, and it is correct in its interpretation of the statute as well as its duty to interpret the Act in light of changing industrial trends. The Seventh Circuit upheld the NLRB's position in Lewis and the Ninth Circuit followed the same ruling in Morris. As the majority stated in Morris, "[a]t its heart, this is a labor law case, not an arbitration case." 227 The FAA does not need to nor should it override the NLRA, as there is no conflict between the two statutes. The illegality of arbitration provisions that restrict concerted legal claims, a core substantive right under the NLRA, means that the savings clause in the FAA prevents the enforcement of such provisions. It is time for all the federal courts to uphold the Board on this issue. It is possible that the current pending cases-Lewis, Morris, and Murphy Oil-will provide the Supreme Court with the opportunity to make the NLRB's D. R. Horton rule the law of the land. The question presented by the NLRB in the Murphy Oil case is framed to enlist the Court's support for the proposition that the illegality of class waivers under the NLRA triggers the FAA's savings clause. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce would prefer to see the more broadly framed questions presented by Lewis and Morris decide the matter. 228 With upwards of seventy percent of employers in the United States using mandatory arbitration provisions, 229 the legality of these contract clauses is of tremendous importance to employees' individual and collective rights. It is important to note that contract law does not preempt the NLRA, a federal statute. As the Supreme Court has previously noted, it is the role of the NLRB to interpret the NLRA in light of changing industrial patterns.
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Mandatory individual arbitration provisions represent such a trend and such provisions clearly fly in the face of the substantive right that guarantees employees: "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection," as well as "the right to refrain from any or all such activities." 231 In addition, the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 157."
232 Employers that mandate individual arbitration and prevent access to group action for dispute resolution, or collective bargaining regarding wages or other working conditions, are blocking concerted activities and collective bargaining in direct violation of the clear language of the statute. The Federal Arbitration Act does not conflict with the NLRA on this issue, because the FAA's savings clause prevents the conflict. The Court should uphold the substantive right to collective action in employment that is embodied in the clear language of the NLRA, as it has in the past.
